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Infrastructure system of systems integrity  
 
Ricardo Peculis and Farid Shirvani 




Infrastructure systems typically consist of technical structures comprising of physical and operational 
components of interrelated constituent systems forming what is now known as system of systems (SOS). 
The complexity and uncertainty of unforeseen events that are inherent characteristic of infrastructure 
systems makes it impossible to predict undesirable emergent behaviours that could push the operation 
of such systems away from their intended purposes. Infrastructure systems present numerous challenges 
throughout their lifecycles. This paper addresses one of these challenges that is presented during 
operation, when managers need to report ‘how well’ the system is performing and find ways to address 
the consequences of unexpected events that often degrade the intended performance. This paper adopts 
a definition of system integrity (SI) to assess the SI for each constituent system and then combines them 
into the overall SI for the SoS. The proposed method is based on the on-going operational performance, 
safety and resilience of the constituent systems and applies the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to 
create a quantitative value derived from experience-based qualitative assessment. In this method, firstly 
the key performance indicators (KPI) for each of the agreed assessment criteria for operational 
performance, safety and resilience are defined and individually assessed. Then the KPIs for each of the 
three criteria are weighted relatively to each other to obtain the overall assessment for operational 
performance, safety and resilience for each individual system. These three criteria are also compared and 
weighted to determine their level of contribution to the SI for the system which is then calculated. The 
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Introduction 
Infrastructure refers to the fundamental facilities and systems serving a country, city, or area, including 
the services and facilities necessary for its economy to function (Sullivan and Sheffrin 2003). It typically 
characterises technical structures such as transport systems which can be defined as the physical and 
operational components of interrelated systems (Fulmer 2009). So, Infrastructure is naturally a set of 
interrelated systems forming what is now known as system of systems. Although there is no single 
definition for system of systems (SoS), there is a consensus that SoS exhibit ‘emergent behaviours’ that 
result from the interaction of constituent systems that are operated and managed independently 
(Nielsen, Larsen et al. 2015). Another definition for SoS is provided in (Mayk and Madni 2006) as “a 
collection of systems that were originally designed as stand-alone systems for specific and different 
purposes but that have been brought together within the SoS umbrella to create a new capability needed 
for a particular mission”. Man-made SoS, like infrastructure systems, are designed to exhibit desirable 
behaviours which are the objectives of the system in the first place.  
 
Infrastructure systems present numerous challenges throughout their lifecycles, from concept definition, 
planning, design and construction through operation and final disposal. One of these challenges, the 
subject of discussion in this paper, is presented during the operation phase when managers need to 
assess ‘how well’ the system operates and will continue operating in the future. It is also under the 





that can degrade the intended quality of operation. The many components of infrastructure systems and 
often constituent systems of the infrastructure SoS need to operate in consonance to achieve the desired 
state of well-being and integrity.  
 
When applied to a system integrity implies the quality of ‘wholeness’ and ‘soundness’. The NASA Systems 
Engineering handbook (Kapurch 2010) defines the system integrity (SI) as “the efficient composition of 
components/subsystems into a whole that offers the required functionality and achieves specific goals”. 
The term system integrity is widely used in the data security context and is defined as “the accuracy and 
consistency of stored data, indicated by an absence of any alteration in data between two updates of a 
data record” (American Heritage Dictionary 2017). SI is integral to the overall system development life 
cycle and systems engineering processes have been used for decades to assess SI during system 
development to assure compliance of design and implementation with specification (Madni and Sievers 
2014).   
 
According to (Neches and Madni 2013) the complex systems today have to satisfy a number of 
requirements such as affordability, reliability, adaptability, security, and resilience. Different kinds of 
system have also different factors that contribute to the overall SI. For example, Sturza (Sturza 1988) 
assesses the quality of a navigation system by examining the faulty measurement sources and suggests 
that the integrity of system output can be assured by monitoring the integrity of the system which is 
defined based on two factors:  probability of missed detection and the probability of false alarm. In 
another study Jayles et. al (Jayles, Chauveau et al. 2016) work on identifying and reducing the abnormal 
behaviour of an orbitography system to avoid degrading the accuracy and performance. SI in this study 
is defined by two factors: availability of the data and identification of the questionable data. Another 
example  provides approaches for managing a water distribution and disinfection system (Trussell 1999) 
and the author claims that safeguarding the SI is the key to assuring the wellbeing of the system, where 
SI is defined based also on two factors: primary disinfection and residual maintenance. Umeadi et. al 
(Umeadi and Jones 2008) also have attempted to develop a process for monitoring the SI of a pipeline 
system as they believe this is associated with disruption to supply, damage to the environment and cost 
to the company. 
 
Despite definition of system integrity in the fields of systems engineering and data security, there is no 
standard agreed definition for system integrity in the context of infrastructure systems in the published 
literature. Furthermore, there is no agreed definition of what factors should be considered to assess the 
integrity of infrastructure systems. The definition provided by (Sullivan and Sheffrin 2003) states that 
infrastructure systems provide services and facilities. Whether the infrastructure system provides water, 
electricity, transport, telecommunications or other services there are always costumers that should be 
satisfied with the delivery of services reflected by the operational performance of the system. 
Operational performance should be one of the factors to be considered to assess the SI of infrastructure 
systems. In addition to operational performance, safety is an important aspect in infrastructure systems 
which should minimise risks that could threat lives and well-being of their customers. Safety should be 
the second factor that contributes to the integrity of infrastructure systems. The third factor suggested 
by this paper is resilience. Resilience is the capacity of the system to recover from disruptions and 
continuing operating in adverse and sometimes unpredictable conditions (Pyster, Olwell et al. 2017). 
Neches describes resilient systems as follows: “A resilient system is trusted and effective out of the box in 
a wide range of contexts, easily adapted to many others through reconfiguration or replacement, with 
graceful and detectable degradation of function” (Neches 2011).  
 
When applied to infrastructure systems, this paper suggests that system integrity is determined by a 
combination of operational performance, safety and resilience. In the context of infrastructure systems 
the ideal system integrity, when the system achieves its maximum integrity, can be defined as the “state 





changes or disruptions in its internal or external environments”. When the system achieves its perfect 
condition its system integrity is 100% or 1.0. The system, however, may operate at lower levels of integrity 
caused by changes or disruptions internal or external to the system. Therefore it is important to assess 
and monitor SI to make sure the system is operating within acceptable levels and to envisage ways to 
improve SI in the event of unexpected situations. 
 
SI can be assessed by using different methods specific to the system of interest and its relevant factors 
which may not be directly applied other systems. For example, the method used for assessing the 
integrity of a water distribution system proposed by (Trussell 1999) cannot be used for assessing the 
integrity of the pipeline system as conducted in (Umeadi and Jones 2008). In an attempt to reduce this 
problem this paper proposes a method to assess system integrity of infrastructure systems that could be 
extended to other kinds of systems. The method applies the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 
1994) to create a quantitative value derived from quantitative and experience-based qualitative 
assessments to determine the SI of  infrastructure systems and SoS by considering three criteria based 
on operational performance, safety and resilience. Each of these three factors is assessed by considering 
their specific ‘key performance indicators’ (KPI): Operational KPIs (KO), Safety KPIs (KS) and Resilience 
KPIs (KR) that are combined in a weighted manner using AHP. As an example, KOs could include KPIs for 
quality of service, reliability, availability, maintainability and cost; KSs could include KPIs for number and 
severity of accidents; and KRs could include KPIs for level of disruption and time for recovery to 
acceptable levels. The proposed method is then applied to a hypothetical urban transport system for 
demonstration purposes.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses SI for one single system and proposes a method 
for assessing SI of infrastructure systems using AHP. Section 3 introduces SI for SoS, proposes a method 
to assess SI of SoS and presents a hypothetical example applying the proposed method. Section 4 
concludes the paper and suggests future work. 
 
Assessing system integrity 
From the context and definition presented in the introduction SI reflects the performance infrastructure 
system during operation. SI can be quantified by assessing how well the system achieves the three criteria 
of operational performance, safety and resilience. The proposed method to assess SI of a single system 
comprises of the following six steps: 
 
Step 1 Define the ‘Key Performance Indicators’ (KPI) used to asses each of the three 
criteria:  operational performance (O), for safety (S) and for resilience (R). 
Each criterion potentially has many KPIs and each KPI should have a method 
to be measured or assessed. 
 
Step 2 For each criterion compare pairwise its KPIs to obtain their relative 
importance using AHP Priority Matrix. This will provide the relative weight 
of each KPI for a given criterion. 
 
Step 3 Using the methods defined in Step 1 assess the actual value for each KPI in 
a scale from 0.0 to 1.0, the latter meaning that the KPI has been fully 
achieved. 
 
Step 4 Using the weights obtained in Step 2 and the actual value for each KPI the 







Step 5 Using AHP Priority Matrix compare pairwise the three criteria to obtain the 
relative weight of each criteria in the context of SI. 
 
Step 6 SI is calculated using the actual values for operational performance, safety 
and resilience obtained in Step 4 and the weights from Step 5. 
 
Step 1 
It is fundamental that the KPIs for operational performance (KOs), safety (KSs) and resilience (KRs) are 
well defined and understood and there are methods to measure or to assess how well the system is 
achieving each KPI. The definition of KPIs and their methods of assessment are out of scope of this paper. 
It is assumed that the engineers, managers and other people in the organisation are capable of defining 
and assessing their pertinent KPIs. 
 
Step 2 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a framework of multi-valued logic based on the innate human 
ability to use information and experience to construct ratio scales through paired comparison (Saaty 
2000). The object of the analysis is arranged in a hierarchic network structure that breaks down the whole 
into its smaller parts thus allowing paired comparison. Paired comparison is done using ‘The Fundamental 
Scale’ of nine levels 1–9, shown in Table 1 (adapted from (Saaty 1994) Table 3.1 and (DiMario, Boardman 
et al. 2009) Table II).  
 





1 Equal importance The two components contribute equally to the 
objective 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgement slightly favour one 
component over the other 
5 Strong importance Experience and judgement strongly favour one 
component over the other 
7 Very strong importance One component is favoured very strongly over 
another; its dominance demonstrated in practice 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one component over 
another is of the highest possible order of 
affirmation 
2, 4, 6, 8 For comparisons 
between the above 
values 
Interpolation of a compromised judgement 
 
The objective of the AHP is to compare all components in the system of interest to determine the weight 
of importance or contribution of each component to the whole. Although AHP has formal mathematical 
foundation it is simple to use and algebraic calculations are easily performed with the aid of mathematical 
software tools. AHP shows that if the system of interest has ‘n’ components, the pair comparison 
constitutes an n x n square matrix named Priority Matrix. 
 
Considering that the operational performance criterion is described by ‘n’ KPIs which a team of 
experienced people should be able to discuss and hopefully agree with how each KPI is more or less 
important to the overall performance. The assessment is done by comparing each operational KPI with 
the other ‘n-1’ KPIs and placing the comparison in a square matrix, as shown in Figure 1. The diagonal of 
the matrix is ‘1’ as it corresponds to the comparison of a KPI with itself. The components Ci,j above the 
diagonal are numbers from ‘1 to 9’ chosen from the ‘the fundamental scale of AHP’ while the components 
below the diagonal are the inverse of the components above because they correspond to the inverse 






The relative weight or priority of each KPI is the normalised principal eigenvector, obtained from the 
maximum eigenvalue, of the Performance Priority Matrix (Saaty 1994) and can be calculated using 
mathematical tools such as MATLAB or other similar tools. The Operational Performance Vector for the 
component ‘c’ (OPVc), equation (1), corresponds to the weight (W) of importance of each of the ‘n’ KOs 
(Operational KPIs) to the overall performance. OPVc needs to be normalised so that the some of its 
components is equal to ‘1.0’, as shown by equation (2). 
 
 KO1 KO2 … KOn-1 KOn 
KO1 1 C1,2 … C1,n-1 C1,n 
KO2 1/C1,2 1 … C2,n-1 C2,n 
… … … .. … … 
KOn-1 1/C1,n-1 1/C2,n-1 … 1 Cn-1,n 
KOn 1/C1,n 1/C2,n … 1/Cn-1,n 1 
 
Figure 1 – The Operational Performance Priority Matrix for one single system component 
 
OPVc= (WOcKO1, WOcKO2, … WOcKOn-1, WOcKOn)   (1) 
𝑾𝑶𝒄 = ∑ 𝑾𝑶𝒄𝒏𝒊=𝟏 koii    (2) 
OPVc  should be normalised so that WOc = 1.0 
 
 
The same process is repeated for the other two criteria of safety and resilience to obtain the relative 
weight of their respective KPIs. 
 
Steps 3 and 4 
In practice the components contributing to the system performance may not be performing at their 
nominal capacity reflecting the ‘actual performance’ (AP) that could be between 0% and 100%. The level 
of ‘acceptable performance’, ‘degraded performance’ or ‘not operational’ can be defined by AP ranges 
and thresholds. AP is calculated or estimated in accordance with predefined and agreed methods. The 
set of values of ‘how well KPIs are achieved’ form the Actual Operational Performance Vector (AOPVc) 
and the product of OPVc and AOPVc transposed is the operational performance (OPc) of that system 
component, as shown by equation (3).  
 
OPc = OPVc X AOPVcT   (3) 
 
If the system has ‘m’ components contributing to the overall operational performance, the same 
approach is used to calculate the operational performance of each component and to assess the level of 
importance of these components to the overall system performance. The latter requires to develop a ‘m 
x m’ Priority Matrix to obtain the Operational Performance Vector for the system (OPV), equation (4), 
which has ‘m’ components. The Actual Operational Performance Vector for the system (AOPV), equation 
(5), contains the actual performance for each component in the system. The overall system operational 
performance (OP) is obtained from the product of OPV and AOPV transposed, shown in equation (6). 
 
OPV = (WOPC1, WOPC2, … WOPCm-1, WOPCm)      (4) 
AOPV = (AOPC1, AOPC2, … AOCm-1, AOPCm)  (5) 
OP = OPV X AOPVT   (6) 
where 𝑶𝑷 = ∑ 𝑾𝑶𝑷𝒎𝒊=𝟏 Ci x AOPCi 
 
Once again the same approach is used to assess the contribution of each component in the system to 
safety and resilience. The method assumes that safety and resilience are properties of the system 
provided by design that can be assessed by safety and resilience KPIs, respectively KSs and KRs, through 





Performance Vector (SPV), equation (7). The Actual Safety Performance Vector (ASPV), equation (8), is 
obtained by assessing how well each KS is being met. The overall safety performance (SP) is the product 
of SPV and ASPV transposed, as shown in equation 9. 
 
SPV = (WSPC1, WSPC2, … WSPCm-1, WSPCm)    (7) 
ASPV = (ASPC1, ASPC2, … ASPCm-1, ASPCm)    (8) 
SP = SPV X ASPVT   (9) 
where 𝑺𝑷 = ∑ 𝑾𝒎𝒊=𝟏 𝑺𝑷Ci x ASPCi 
 
Resilient systems can be achieved by capabilities within system or as an emergent property through 
collaboration with other systems. The first is achieved by design provided by redundant or backup 
components that are part of the system (Pyster, Olwell et al. 2017). The second is achieved by emergent 
properties of SoS and will be discussed in the next section. Resilience performance can be assessed using 
the same methods as for operational and safety performances, as shown by equations (10) to (12). 
 
RPV = (WRPC1, WRPC2, … WRPCm-1, WRPCm)   (10) 
ARPV = (ARPC1, ARPC2, … ARPCm-1, ARPCm)   (11) 
RP = RPV X ARPVT    (12) 
where 𝑹𝑷 = ∑ 𝑾𝒎𝒊=𝟏 𝑹𝑷Ci x ASPCi 
 
Steps 5 and 6 
Finally, it is also need to assess the level of importance of each of the three assessment criterion of 
operational performance, safety and resilience to obtain the overall SI and the same approach is used 
once again, now in the form of a 3 x 3 Priority Matrix shown in Figure 2. Equation (13) shows the System 
Integrity Vector (SIV) and equation (15) shows the overall System Integrity (SI) as the multiplication of SIV 
and the transposed Actual System Integrity Vector (ASIV), equation 14, which contains the actual 
operational performance (O), safety (S) and resilience (R) for the system. 
 
 O S R 
Operational (O) 1 PS PR 
Safety (S) SP = 1/ PS 1 SR 
Resilience (R) RP = 1/ PR RS = 1/ SR 1 
 
Figure 2 – The Priority Matrix for System Integrity 
 
SIV = (WO, WS, WR)  (13) 
ASIV = (O, S, R)  (14) 
SI = SIV X ASIVT  (15) 
where SI = WO x O + WS x S + WR x R 
 
It is reasonable to assume that safety would have a higher level of importance over operational 
performance and resilience. Operational performance could be considered a little higher than resilience 
because resilience is not expected to be activated frequently and some level of operational performance 
degradation may be acceptable. However, the weight of operational performance, safety and resilience 
should vary from system to system and should be estimated accordingly. 
 
Assessing system of systems integrity: an example 
Urban transport is a system of systems often comprising multi-mode forms of transport, a shared 
ticketing system, roads, parking and tolls. The example used to apply the System Integrity Assessment 
method to a SoS is a hypothetical simplified urban transport system comprising of a network of trains 





independently managed and operated, and collaborates with the other systems to achieve the overall 
urban transport service, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
The three constituent systems work together to achieve three objectives of operational performance (O), 
safety (S) and resilience (R) that are not equally shared by the constituent systems. Safety is very 
important for trains and buses but not as important for the ticketing system because the latter does not 
present the same level of safety risks as the other two. Operational performance also depends of 
different kinds of collaboration between the constituent systems. The flow of passengers between trains 
and buses and through the ticketing system is important for meeting the revenue KPI. Without Ticketing 
neither the Rail or Bus systems would be able to collect revenue and without passengers from train and 
buses the Ticketing system would not be able to collect its share for the ticketing service. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Hypothetical Urban Transport SoS 
 
For the example here presented the Bus system collaborates with the Rail system to provide resilience. 
Buses can replace trains for a particular section of the Rail line when it is not operating due to failure or 
maintenance. The inverse, however, is not possible because in practice trains are unlikely to be able to 
replace buses in a significant portion of their routes. 
 
To assess the SI of this urban transport SoS the method proposed in section 2 is extended with four 
additional steps. 
 
Step 7 Estimate the level of importance of each constituent system for each of the 
three criteria of performance, safety and resilience using AHP supermatrix 
approach. 
 
Step 8 Estimate the relevance of each of the three criteria relevant for each of the 
three constituent systems is assessed using AHP supermatrix approach. 
 
Step 9 Calculate the relative weight of each constituent systems and each 
individual criterion by stabilising the AHP supermatrix. 
 
Step 10 Calculate the SI for the SoS using the individual SI for each constituent 






Steps 7 and 8 
To assess the SI of this urban transport SoS it is needed to weight the contribution of each constituent 
systems to the overall SI and also weight the three criteria of operational performance, safety and 
resilience in the context of the SoS as a whole. AHP can be applied to systems with feedback loops where 
individual components and assessment criteria influence each other (Saaty 1994). AHP has been used in 
many complex systems applications including the investigation of emergent properties of SoS (DiMario, 
Boardman et al. 2009), the decision-making process to develop sustainable infrastructure (Diaz-
Sarachaga, Jato-Espino et al. 2017) and to model a software-intensive acquisition for a naval helicopter 
(Peculis, Rogers et al. 2007). 
 
The bottom left part of the supermatrix in Figure 4 answers the question ‘what is the level of importance 
of each constituent system for each of the three criteria of performance, safety and resilience?’. The top 
right part of the supermatrix answers the question of ‘what of the three criteria is more relevant for each 
of the three constituent systems?’. The weights placed in the supermatrix reflect the characteristics of 
the urban transport SoS and could have been estimated using Priority Matrices as discussed in section 3. 
Here, however, the weights were estimated directly for simplicity and hypothetical nature of this 
example. 
 
 Ra Bu Tk O S R 
Rail (Ra) 0 0 0 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Bus (Bu) 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Ticketing (Tk) 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Operational (O) 0.4 0.4 0.6 0 0 0 
Safety (S) 0.5 0.5 0.2 0 0 0 
Resilience (R) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 
  
Figure 4 – Hypothetical Urban Transport SoS Supermatrix 
 
Step 9 
The sum of the weights of each column of the supermatrix is equal to 1.0 which is characteristic of 
‘stochastic supermatrix’ which can be stabilised by raising it to power, i.e. multiplying the matrix by itself 
several times, until all the columns have the same values for each block, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 Ra Bu Tk O S R 
Rail (Ra) 0 0 0 0.5457 0.5457 0.5457 
Bus (Bu) 0 0 0 0.3114 0.3114 0.3114 
Ticketing (Tk) 0 0 0 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 
Operational (O) 0.4286 0.4286 0.4286 0 0 0 
Safety (S) 0.4571 0.4571 0.4571 0 0 0 
Resilience (R) 0.1143 0.1143 0.1143 0 0 0 
  
Figure 5 – Hypothetical Urban Transport SoS stabilised Supermatrix 
 
The three weights shown in the bottom left of the matrix correspond to WO, WS and WR of equation (13) 
and are used to calculate the SI for each constituent systems as per equations (14) and (15). The three 
weights in the top right of the matrix are the relative weights for the SI of each constituent system and 
form the Urban Transport System Integrity Vector (UTSIV) as per equation (16). 
 
UTSIV = (WRa, WBu, WTk) (16) 
 
Step 10 
Finally, the SI of the urban transport SoS is calculated by multiplying UTSIV by the Actual Urban Transport 





respectively the actual values for SI for Rail, Bus and the Ticketing constituent systems calculated using 
the method presented in section 2. 
 
AUTSI V= (ASIRa, ASIBu, ASITk) (17) 
UTSI = UTSIV x AUTSIVT (18) 
where UTSI = WRa x ASIRa + WBu x ASIBu + WTk x ASITk 
 
Conclusions 
This paper proposed a method to assess system integrity for systems and system of systems using AHP. 
The method relies on the human ability of performing pairwise comparison and in the capability of 
engineers and managers to define and assess key indicators of operational performance, safety and 
resilience for the systems they are responsible for. The method also assumes that engineers and 
managers would be able to agree on KPIs, their respective methods of assessment and the on the relative 
weights for each of their assessment criterion.  
 
The proposed method allows infrastructure professionals to identify KPIs and components in the system 
or SoS that have higher influence on SI which in turn should have higher priority for improvements, issues 
identification and resolution. 
 
The authors acknowledge that uncertainty and lack of confidence can be present in the process of 
developing Priority Matrices and relative weights between the elements in the system. Techniques like 
fuzzy hierarchical analysis (Buckley 1985) can be used to address uncertainty in the process of assessing 
system integrity and will be subject of future work. 
 
The proposed method is yet to be tested in practice which becomes an important component of future 
work which could also address larger systems and SoS with more components, constituent systems, 
interdependencies and assessment criteria set. In the meantime the authors hope that this paper will be 
able to motivate infrastructure managers and decision-makers to consider the application of this method 
into their own real systems and SoS. It is of great importance that these professionals reflect upon the 
definition of system integrity in the context of their specific systems, which should lead to the 
identification of system components, constituent systems, assessment criteria and weight of relevance, 
influence and importance. The method here proposed should provide guidance for a good start and could 
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